The variety of ideas about ways nature is 'valued' in public policymaking are investigated. A theoretical ideational approach is combined with empirical analysis of the UK's Ecosystem Services Framework. Several types of ideas are identified, and how they interact is examined: ideas about nature itself; about the role that different research on the value of nature can or should play in decision-making; and about how policy decisions are made. In particular, the ways these ideas appear in academic debates, especially in ecological economics and philosophy, are confronted with how ideas appear in the policy practice of employing a 'valuing nature' concept. This reveals political dynamics sometimes missed by both advocates and critics of the concept of ecosystem services, such as the importance of promoting organisations and their agendas and activities, persuading different actors to change positions, and institutional commitments and sunk costs.
particularly interesting case because the current literature reveals a rich variety of approaches to 'valuing nature' across different disciplines. It includes extensive literatures in economics (e.g. Turner et al. 2003 , Costanza et al. 2014 ) and ecological sciences (e.g. Balvanera et al. 2016 , Raffaelli 2016 ) on techniques for valuing natural environments and assessing impacts of policies. There is also growing work in development studies around, for example, justice implications of attempts to value nature (e.g. Sikor 2013 ). Some philosophers have mounted a strong critique of the principles and process of such attempts (e.g. Read and Scott Cato 2014, James 2016) . But communication between these positions is often frustratingly unfruitful (although there are positive initiatives: in the UK see for example the Ecosystems Knowledge Network 1 , the Natural Capital Initiative 2 , the Valuing Nature Network 3 and the UK Arts & Humanities Research Council 4 ). We claim that one reason these debates are hard to resolve is a lack of clarity about the different ideas behind the policy positions and prescriptions, mixing positive, theoretical and normative positions. We note that 'ambiguity and incoherence in ideas opens space for politics as people seek to make policy decisions reflect their preferred interpretation' (Béland and Cox 2010, p. 9) . This is certainly the case for environmental problems, which are particularly prone to debates between differing ideas about what problems are, and what could or should be done about them (Dryzek 2013 ). This is not a normative concern on our part. It is rather a challenge that an explicitly ideational approach to studying 'valuing nature' might provide an alternative perspective to help take forward some of the debates. In particular, since better understanding of ideas is a key aspect of political analysis, this is also a way in to studying a concept's use (or lack thereof) in public policymaking.
Ideas do not occur in a vacuum; what they mean in practice is at least as important as in theory, and reveals different political dynamics (e.g. Mehta 2010 ). This is particularly important for a case like 'valuing nature', which suggests itself as a quintessential policy analytical technique within an administrative rationalist discourse (Dryzek 2013 ).
Interrogating the extent to which that is the case, 'the search for administrative rationalism should begin not with the writings of theorists and the proclamations of activists, but with an examination of actual policy practice' (Dryzek 2013, p. 90) . Here, we confront differing ideas about valuing nature 'in theory' with ideas wrapped up in the policy practice of employing a 'valuing nature' concept, including examining whose ideas are seen as relevant.
This builds on a growing literature that unpacks the normative, political and ideological underpinnings of broadly economic ideas around nature, in particular their (variable) appearance in policy practice with sometimes paradoxical outcomes (see for example Fuentes-George 2013 , Rodriguez de Francisco and Boelens 2015 , Coffey 2016 . It speaks too to the wider perspective that policymaking is less a rational, apolitical process of solving clear given problems, and more a space where problems and solutions are actively constructed (e.g. Bacchi 2009 ).
We employ a case study of the Ecosystem Services Framework in the UK, within which we aim to 'identify the ideas people use' (Béland and Cox 2010, p. 14) around valuing nature, in both academic debates and in policy practice. This is an important first step, because debates around valuing nature are so contested and apparently complex; there is not one easily-identifiable idea, although particular ideas such as putting a monetary value on nature's services to humans appear prominently. To achieve these aims we employ a methodology that combines a more theoretical ideational approach with empirical analysis, including elite interviews with practitioners. We do not look directly at the influence of one idea on policy outputs; elsewhere (e.g. we examine the (lack of) influence of ideas about valuing nature on policy processes.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we present a framework for analysing ideas, followed by some of the main ideas thus evident in literature across various academic disciplines. We then introduce the particular UK case, introducing first the Ecosystem Services Framework and then our approach to the empirical research. We follow this by
proposing five different types of ideas about the Ecosystem Services Framework in policy practice, as revealed by the empirical research. In the final section, we re-interpret these findings through the groupings obtained from the literature review, drawing conclusions about the dynamics of ideas, and the importance of observing ideas in policy practice as well as in theory.
Ideas present in the concept of 'valuing nature'
What value is attached to the natural environment in the process of public policymaking? For an increasing number of commentators the answer is 'not enough', leading to major impacts on the ecological and natural systems upon which human wellbeing depends (MA 2005 , Rockström et al. 2009 ). But some judgement about this value, however implicit, is always made in every policy process that has any relation to the natural world. Exactly how natural systems are valued is hence a key question. Yet the concept of valuing nature is acknowledged to be nebulous by both academics (Cowell and Lennon 2014, Haines-Young and Potschin 2014) and practitioners (a typical response being this from a senior UK government official: 'it is the current sexy term but people struggle to understand what it means'), and hence potentially a source of conflict and a contested policy debate. This lack of clear meaning suggests we might find a rich tapestry of different but overlapping ideas, along with a variety of mechanisms for promoting these ideas.
Following Jal Mehta (2010), we explore ideas of valuing nature through a three-fold classification. The first dimension is that of policy solutions. This type of idea might be summarised as 'the solution is....'; in our case the solution could be a particular framework or technique for specifying the value of a natural environment (e.g. UK NEA 2014). But the question arises straightaway: 'the solution to what?'. Therefore the second dimension is based on the assumption that a policy solution contains ideas, either implicitly or explicitly, about the problems being addressed. These are the organising principles of policy and suggest a range of possible solutions. Problem definition is a contested process, whether actors are aware of this or not, to establish a particular way of understanding a complex reality (Mehta 2010, p. 27 ). In our case, one problem could be framed as 'nature is undervalued in public policy-making'. There is a third dimension of types of ideas: public philosophies, which includes deep-core worldviews and assumptions about the world, particularly related to government. These may be openly questioned, or they may be implicit.
In the case of valuing nature, an example would be 'protecting nature is important'. These different levels influence each other (Mehta 2010) . For example, the failure of a particular policy solution to achieve its aims makes the underlying problem definition less viable.
Conversely, the success of a policy solution can expand the attendant problem definition.
Public philosophies also draw credibility from success or failure of attendant problem definitions.
In the case of valuing nature, there are substantial literatures that set out different policy solutions, problems, and public philosophies. Our primary purpose here is not to reproduce all the arguments in this literature, but to set out some of the most prominent ideas present for comparison with ideas in practice derived from empirical work. Within these literatures, we observe at least three such types of ideas: ideas about nature itself, about research to value nature, and about the role in policy of research on valuing nature.
Ideas about nature itself
At the level of public philosophy, there is widespread agreement that nature is the basis of human survival (Costanza et al. 2014) . A commonly-expressed variant is of nature as a form of capital, and nature as the basis of the economy (see for example debates in Spangenberg and Settele 2010, Costanza et al. 2014 , Pellizzoni 2015 , Spash and Aslaksen 2015 . Nature here is seen as vitally important, with a corresponding idea that nature must be protected in some way, and must cross academic disciplinary divides and practitioner perspectives. But another public philosophy explicitly opposes the view that nature can be reduced to its instrumental services to human beings (e.g. Lockwood 1999 , Kosoy and Corbera 2009 , Norgaard 2010 , Spangenberg and Settele 2010 , Castree and Henderson 2014 , Read and Scott Cato 2014 , James 2016 . Opposition is partly to a language of commodification, which misses specific environments being parts of valuable wholes, a sense of human place, and conceptual and moral problems with substituting nature with other types of 'capital'.
These ideas are related to particular problem definitions. Problems are sometimes expressed around nature being in crisis (e.g. Pellizzoni 2015) , and that proper consideration of the natural environment is missing in decision-making. The problems are in turn related to particular policy solutions. Attaching an economic value to natural systems, such as through an Ecosystem Services Framework (e.g. Turner et al. 2003 , Fisher et al. 2009 ), is one commonly-advocated policy solution. This is itself clearly premised upon public philosophies about nature as a form of capital, and the basis for the economy. Strong critiques of this policy solution are premised upon alternative problems and public philosophies, such as scepticism of a commodification of nature (Kosoy and Corbera 2009 , Spangenberg and Settele 2010 , Read and Scott Cato 2014 . These lead to alternative policy solutions (Norgaard 2010) , which embed alternative problems and public philosophies, such as legal remedies and alternative views of what counts as valuable (e.g. Lockwood 1999 , Kumar and Kumar 2008 , Read and Scott Cato 2014 , James 2016 ).
Ideas about research to value nature
Public philosophies include the idea that it is possible to put a meaningful numerical value on nature (Spangenberg and Settele 2010) -and that it is essential to do so since credibility of advice is premised on being able to speak the language of economic and numerical values (Costanza et al. 2014) . This public philosophy is based on a belief that 'environmental concerns lack a voice at the political table and that modernity is obsessed with economics ...
[which justifies] changing to the language of money and finance as a necessary evil' (Spash and Aslaksen 2015, p. 248) . It is also seen as possible by some to separate value to humans from intrinsic value (e.g. Fisher et al. 2009 ). 'Problems' associated with these public philosophies include the claim that putting values on nature marginalises some peoples' ways of knowing (Sikor 2013) , and generally limits what is counted as 'important' (e.g. Norgaard 2010), prioritising for example anthropocentric concerns, failing to capture elements that cannot be measured, and assuming the objectivity of analysis (Read and Scott Cato 2014) .
Conversely, incomplete knowledge about how environmental systems work can be seen as a problem for those advocating numerical values (e.g. de Groot et al. 2010 ). These problems suggest certain policy solutions, including actively seeking to expand knowledge (e.g. of tipping points or impacts) (Fisher et al. 2009 , de Groot et al. 2010 , or of using different tools like multi-criteria analysis to capture wider concepts of value beyond numerical representations of exchange (Lockwood 1999 , Read and Scott Cato 2014 , Spash and Aslaksen 2015 , Armstrong 2016 , James 2016 ).
Ideas about the role in policy of research on valuing nature
The literature reveals, through the debate around valuing nature, differing ideas about how policy decisions are made. Underlying public philosophies particularly include the idea that better and more comprehensive knowledge about a subject will lead to better decisions in that area (Farber et al. 2002 , Turner et al. 2003 , Fisher et al. 2009 , de Groot et al. 2010 , Costanza et al. 2014 . Exactly how this might work also appears: the idea that people respond best to the language of economics (Spangenberg and Settele 2010), or that people change their decisions when alarmed about consequences. A key idea is the perceived need to provide a way for decision-makers to decide which priorities to pursue in what order (Fisher et al. 2009 ). The related policy solutions proposed depend especially on public philosophies. If the public philosophy is that good policy requires better analysis, and the only research assumed to be credible in this process involves numerical / economic values on natural systems, then the policy solution becomes clear. However, an alternative public philosophy, on the importance of dialogue and political leadership in policymaking, would lead to a different type of policy solution, around wider and more inclusive debate about the right policy direction to take (e.g. Norgaard 2010).
In summary
Based on the brief review above (see Table 1 for a simplified summary), it can be seen that some aspects of ideas are more widely held: especially around the public philosophies and problems about the importance of nature, the threats to nature and the importance of political action to redress these threats. Disagreements seem to focus more on: policy solutions, on the one hand, and, on the other, the research approach to valuing nature, and the role this does or should take in influencing decisions. There is thus a sense that some academics are suggesting a controversial solution to a commonly-agreed problem and public philosophy. Overall, these debates within and between disciplines focus much on whether valuing is a right -or necessary -thing to do, and also the importance of valuing nature for achieving certain ends such as improving equity in societies or improving environmental protection.
Debates are often rather normative around whether there are fundamental structural constraints on environmental action. However, the debates often do not yield much more than a (re-)statement of different positions.
More importantly, a critical engagement with the third type of idea -about the role in policy of research on valuing nature -features much less prominently in these debates. This suggests a line of enquiry which shifts the focus beyond the ostensible idea of valuing nature -exploring what valuing nature could / should / ought (not) to do and how and why we should (not) be doing it -onto examining the ways the concept is actually used in practice.
There is an emerging area of research in political science around utilisation of knowledge about nature in different policy venues , and what shapes and constrains its use. This area of work starts with the premise that 'what counts as knowledge and how it is presented... is an inescapably political act' (Jordan and Russel 2014, p. 194) . In particular, Mehta (2010, p. 35) has argued that political dynamics around ideas in policy practice are often over specific types of ideas:
Where a political decision needs to be made, the fight will usually be over the policy itself. Problem definition is generally in the background; it enters into the discussion surreptitiously as each argument for or against the policy implicitly privileges one problem definition over another. In contrast, discussions in the media or in the academic literature are more often explicitly about how to define an issue.
Next, we investigate how far this is the case in the policy practice around valuing nature, through a specific case study where attempts have been made to embed a mechanism for valuing nature within policymaking.
Case Study and Research Design
The UK Ecosystem Services Framework
We focus specifically on the Ecosystem Services Framework ( 
Approach to research
We do this by examining the presence of policies, problems and public philosophies revealed through 32 semi-structured elite interviews with a range of -broadly labelled -'policy practitioners'. To ensure a range of perspectives was captured, a four-fold classification of policy advisors (Howlett 2011) people were approached and a total of 32 agreed to participate, from UK and devolved governments, arms-length bodies, consultancies, and non-governmental organisations ( Table   2 ). The interviewees were asked a number of questions based around what they saw as the aim of the ESF, how important it is to their sector/organisation/day-to-day work responsibilities, the factors influencing the adoption of the ESF in their organisation or sector more generally, the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the ESF, the ways they have attempted (if at all) to embed the ESF in policymaking processes, and the main factors that limit -or enable -this embedding. Interviews took a semi-structured format to allow for both comparability and flexibility. These questions were broad enough to explore views on the 'ideas' of ESF while simultaneously avoiding steering or leading the interviewees. The interviews were conducted either face-to-face or via telephone. Interview summary transcripts were produced shortly after each interview to enable thematic data analysis. 
interviewees
In the following analysis, the references to perspectives of different interviewees have been anonymised in the following way, referring back to The relative weights of points made by interviewees are visible through indication of the numbers and range of interviewees who made those points.
Ideas about ESF in policy practice
At the most general level, the ESF aims to 'inform decisions' . The problems and philosophies embedded within these ideas relate to a need to maintain funding sources, and a need to follow the most appropriate formulation (logic of appropriateness) (see Powell and DiMaggio 1991) .
Discussion
The above analysis shows that the idea of ESF becomes very malleable when entering the policy domain. Policy practitioner ideas of what the ESF means are multiple and nuanced.
For many policymakers it helped them do the work they were already doing, suggesting that they can see it as not necessarily a new idea but an extension of existing agendas (e.g.
promoting the environment through the persuasive power of official reports, promoting an organisation's pre-existing agenda, or promoting learning about the value of nature to nonenvironmental bodies). They can also see it as something to meld or manipulate around their own agendas (learning within a pre-existing set of problems -joining up, tailoring language around ESF to achieve other objectives forming different philosophies and policy solutions around common problems). The data also suggest that other policy actors engaged with the ideas simply as something that they had to do. In some cases this was met with indifference (simply name-checking the concept), others saw it as an opportunity (to get funding), and in some cases there was hostility as ESF challenged underlying values and procedures.
What does this tell us about the multiple ideational functions of ESF in policy practice, and, in particular, how these relate to the ideas present in the academic literature (Table 1) ? Woven through the five idea types derived from the interviews are the same three ideational themes -about nature itself, about research to value nature, and about the role in policy of research on valuing nature -as in the literature. How these appear in policy practice has some similarities with their representation in the academic literature, but there are also important differences.
Ideas about nature itself
The underlying public philosophies both in literature and practice seem to be heavily focussed on what nature does for society (see for example Costanza et al. 2014) . But there is also an argument that appears more commonly among practitioners, around the idea that protecting nature can be a brake on economic progress; this has been particularly pertinent as economies seek to recover from the 2008 economic crisis (Russel and Benson 2014) . In terms of 'problems', both academic debates and most practitioners interviewed recognise the interdependencies of the environment, society and the economy, how these interdependencies These aspects point towards ideas that go well beyond anything to do with nature, but are filters through which any research will be seen. This compares with an academic debate that is often more narrowly focused on (how to express the) value of nature. To some extent these differences are understandable as policy makers have to balance the ESF with other government objectives, so focusing on improvements to administrative measures is a pragmatic way of taking the agenda forward within the wider context. Literature debates tend to be more focused on the problem and thus promote a more normative and instrumental agenda.
Concluding comments on the dynamics of ideas
We conclude by returning to Mehta's (2010, p. 35) arguments about the dynamics of ideas:
Where a political decision needs to be made, the fight will usually be over the policy itself. Problem definition is generally in the background; it enters into the discussion surreptitiously as each argument for or against the policy implicitly privileges one problem definition over another. In contrast, discussions in the media or in the academic literature are more often explicitly about how to define an issue
Similarly, many points made by our interviewees are related to differing ideas about the policy solution, but also explicitly reflect differing problem and public philosophy ideas.
Mehta does not deny problem definition is present in political practice but rather that it is surreptitious. However, among practitioners in the case of ESF in the UK, arguments are not so much over policy design, but there are quite clear political fights over resources, perceived problems, and different philosophies. Conversely, academic debates (e.g. Constanza et al. 2014, Read and Scott Cato 2014) in the field of valuing nature are often over the solution rather than necessarily the philosophy. However, problem definition is important when considering what is being implemented and why. Indeed, the multi-faceted manner in which ESF is interpreted by our interviewees may undermine the ESF's potential for having a coherent influence on policymaking. There are multiple ideas present, and interactions between them, in terms of solutions, problem definition and public philosophies, for example whether the ESF is a help or hindrance in promoting biodiversity preservation. Causes of debates in one idea are sometimes found in other ideas (i.e. not necessarily driven by philosophies in the same idea). For example, philosophies about the nature of research, and the role of research in policymaking, can strongly influence ideas about how best to capture the value of nature itself.
If the ESF was designed as a quintessentially administratively rationalist policy analysis technique for improving the state of the environment (Dryzek 2013) , then the multiplicity of ideas embedded within and around it reveal both the limits of the tool, and the limits of administrative rationalism in addressing environmental problems. What may appear on the surface to be a 'rational' solution to a clear problem becomes an idea having an impact, but not necessarily in relation to the policy solution it was promoted to address.
Policymakers fit the concept into the context of their day-to-day practice, focusing more on administrative issues rather than trying to pin down the value of nature and integrating this within policymaking in a systematic manner. Our research thus shows how ideational politics can create a mismatch between academic advocates of an idea to solve an identified problem, and practitioner implementation of the solutions. In the case of ESF, this mismatch can arguably be partly attributed to the concept's development -by ecologists and economists with associated normative assumptions over the philosophy of intervention, the nature of the problems, the solutions needed, and how policy is made, which can be very different from those of practitioners.
Overall, we suggest our insights help better understand the widely differing reactions to the concept of valuing nature, and especially the specific case of the ESF. In so doing we challenge Mehta's arguments on the dynamics of ideas, while confirming the notion that the ideas are fluid, and deployed in a wide variety of ways (Béland and Cox 2010) , and the importance of examining practice as well as the concepts; the debates may be a lot more nuanced than what they appear to be about. How 'valuing nature' is actually used is so different from theory that it might be argued that they are different ideas. The empirical evidence presented here particularly shows how ambiguity and contestation around ideas open up political space; as an idea is employed day-to-day by policy practitioners, it broadens the original idea beyond its academic roots. Political science perspectives can illuminate practitioners' very different ideas of the concept and uses of research, and practitioners might also learn something through systematic analysis and the revealing of ideas. Finally, we have has also shown more generally the importance of considering the boundary not just between concept and practice, but between academic disciplines. Different disciplines see ideassuch as those around valuing nature -differently, and drawing this out may help take longstanding and seemingly intractable debates forward.
